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Competing firms often have the possibility to jointly determine the magnitude of consumers’ 
switching costs. Examples include compatibility decisions and the option of introducing 
number portability in telecom and banking. We put forward a model where firms jointly 
decide to reduce switching costs before competing in prices during two periods. We 
demonstrate that the outcome hinges crucially on how the joint action reduces consumers’ 
switching costs. In particular, firms will enhance their market power if they implement 
measures that reduce consumers’ switching costs by a lump sum. Conversely, they will 
preserve market power by not implementing actions that reduce switching costs 
proportionally. Hence, when policy makers design consumer protection policies, they should 
not always adopt a favourable attitude towards efforts by firms to reduce switching costs. 
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Switching costs are known to bind customers to ﬁrms. Consequently, con-
sumers’ initial choices partly determine their future decisions (Klemperer
(1995) and Farrell and Klemperer (2007) provide excellent overviews). The
origin of switching costs may be exogenous, e.g. in situations where con-
sumers experience shopping costs. However, ﬁrms are often tempted to
inﬂuence switching costs for strategic reasons. Consequently, they assume
an endogenous character (see e.g., Farrell and Gallini (1988), Matutes and
Regibeau (1988), and Klemperer and Padilla (1997)).
In this paper, we consider ﬁrms that are able to jointly determine the
magnitude of consumers’ switching costs. For example, when ﬁrms agree
to set uniform industry standards, they lower the switching costs for con-
sumers who may wish to buy from a competing supplier in the aftermarket.
Similarly, telecom companies who decide (mutually) to adopt number porta-
bility will in eﬀect reduce the switching costs for any consumer who wishes
to switch from one telecom supplier to another. Banks, for their part, can
reduce switching costs by oﬀering standardized “switching packs” or by in-
troducing account number portability. Finally, competing stock exchanges
may adopt a common settlement system to make it easier for ﬁrms and
investors to switch from one exchange to another.
An important insight of the literature on switching costs is that, in a
given market, an increase in switching costs will raise average prices and
may thus result in higher proﬁts for ﬁrms (See Farrell and Klemperer, 2006).
Hence, there is a concern that ﬁrms may, for strategic reasons, forego reduc-
tions in consumer switching costs, while public policy will strive to minimize
such costs. However, we are able to demonstrate that, in situations where
the magnitude of switching costs varies for consumers, the competitive ef-
2fect of a switching-cost reduction hinges crucially on how the reduction is
achieved. We attribute this outcome to the kind of technology applied or
action implemented in order to reduce the cost of switching. More speciﬁ-
cally, we consider two types of switching-cost reduction, i.e. a proportional
versus a lump-sum reduction.
With the proportional approach, consumers facing high switching costs
will enjoy a more substantial decrease in absolute terms than those facing a
lower cost of switching. This situation may arise, for example, when ﬁrms
introduce a (commonly developed) user-friendly guide on how consumers
can switch more easily from one supplier to the other. Consumers with
low switching costs will beneﬁt only marginally from such a guide, while
those facing higher switching costs stand to beneﬁtm o r es u b s t a n t i a l l y .A n
example of this approach is found in Miles (2004), who recommends it for
the UK mortgage market. In his report on how to improve the functioning
of this market, he concludes that, to borrowers, the process of switching
may represent itself as a barrier to remortgaging. This is especially the case
for borrowers who are ﬁnancially illiterate and who perceive switching to a
more favorable mortgage to be prohibitively expensive. This group will gain
the most from a user-friendly guide on how to switch mortgages. Borrowers
who are suﬃciently ﬁnancially literate, on the other hand, will beneﬁtt oa
lesser degree.
With the lump-sum approach, the cost of switching is reduced by a ﬁxed
amount. This situation arises, for example, when enhanced compatibility
cuts the cost of adapting by a certain ﬁxed amount, irrespective of the ini-
tial level of switching costs. Consumers with low switching costs will beneﬁt
from the switching cost reduction as much as consumers experiencing large
switching costs. In other words, all consumers will beneﬁt to the same de-
3gree. Number portability serves as a good example of a lump-sum reduction
in switching costs. In the medical sector, patients with a complicated med-
ical past may ﬁnd it harder to switch to another practice than patients with
a straightforward record. Recently, the National Health System in the UK
has introduced GP2GP — an electronic transfer of health records between GP
practices — that aims at reducing switching costs between medical practices
for patients.
Our ﬁndings may be summarized as follows. First, approaches whereby
switching costs are reduced proportionally will tend to be rejected by ﬁrms
because they enhance competition. In our two-period model, a propor-
tional decrease in switching costs is shown to cut second-period proﬁts from
poaching rival’s customers. This will make ﬁrms more aggressive in the ﬁrst
period, resulting in tougher intertemporal competition. Hence, ﬁrms may be
expected to reject any such lowering of consumers’ switching costs. Second,
ﬁrms are able to relax competition by cutting all consumers’ switching costs
with a lump sum. The underlying reason is that such a lump-sum reduc-
tion will increase proﬁtability of second-period poaching. As a result, ﬁrms
will behave less aggressive in the ﬁrst period, thereby relaxing intertem-
poral competition. With a lump-sum decrease, both ﬁrms will see their
proﬁts increase. Third, social welfare invariably increases through propor-
tional reduction of switching costs. Finally, our results suggest that policy
makers should be careful when implementing measures that will allow ﬁrms
to reduce consumers’ switching costs.
Our model provides insights into situations in various industries where
ﬁrms are able to jointly aﬀect consumers’ switching costs. A ﬁrst example re-
lates to compatibility decisions by enterprises. Producers of systems of goods
— where consumers are required to buy diﬀerent components for combined
4use, as in the video games and games consoles markets— may decide to intro-
duce technology that makes their basic products compatible. Some authors
have argued that reducing switching costs by introducing compatibility will
enhance oligopoly power. Matutes and Regibeau (1988), for example, con-
sider compatibility decisions by ﬁrms producing a two-component system,
but where consumers decide to buy these components simultaneously. They
show that ﬁrms prefer compatibility over incompatibility, as the former leads
to higher prices. Moreover, Mariñoso (2001) shows that ﬁrms may prefer
compatibility because incompatibility leads to higher endogenous switching
costs and increases intertemporal price competition. Our model reveals that
the nature of the switching-cost reduction action is important in explaining
why that action is voluntarily adopted or not.
A second example concerns number portability decisions by telecom com-
panies.1 Number portability reduces switching costs. With number portabil-
ity, consumers can switch more easily from one telecom provider to another,
without needing to inform their potential callers. Viard (2003, 2007) studies
the introduction of a regulatory regime in the US that enforces 800-number
portability while not allowing ﬁrms to price discriminate between old and
new customers. His theoretical model shows that an increase in switching
costs can make markets either more or less competitive. His empirical ﬁnd-
ings indicate that prices will drop after the introduction of number portabil-
ity. This suggests that switching costs make markets less competitive and
that ﬁrms will hence be opposed to number portability in the telecom sector.
1Gans et al. (2001) deal with the more practical side of technology choice and cost
distribution in the implementation of number portability in telephony. They propose a
scheme of property rights of phone numbers in order to obtain eﬃcient technology choice.
Another important issue is raised by Buehler and Haucap (2004), who state that number
portability not only lowers switching costs, but also creates “consumer ignorance” on the
destination of the call, which is harmful if pricing is substantially dependent on this.
5Our model looks at situations where ﬁrms are allowed to price discriminate
between “new” and “old” customers, as is the case in many sectors, and
again points to the importance of the nature of the action or technology
implemented in order to reduce switching costs.
A third example pertains to the retail ﬁnancial sector. Retail bank-
ing market integration is high on the agenda of various public authorities
(see for example European Commission (2006) for an analysis of the latest
developments in these markets). Switching costs are often cited as ma-
jor obstacles to market integration and enhancement of competition (see
for example Miles (2004) on the UK mortgage market and Cruickshank
(2000) and Gondat-Larralde and Nier (2004) on the UK deposit retail mar-
ket).2 Two policies are often considered to reduce switching costs in retail
deposit banking markets. The ﬁrst is the implementation of “switching
packs”. Consumers face less administrative burden in changing supplier
when banks standardize the process of switching account number through
switching packs (see for example the Netherlands, the UK and Ireland). A
second, more structural way is the introduction of account number portabil-
ity. For example, the ECAFS (2006) report puts forward account number
portability as an ideal scenario for the Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA),
which would create a pan-European market with uniform account numbers
that are owned by the customer. After all, in the absence of number porta-
bility, the main drawback of switching current accounts is that the account
2Only few attempts have been undertaken to measure switching costs directly in bank-
ing markets. Kim et al. (2003) use data on the Norwegian loan market, and ﬁnd the costs
of switching to be as high as 4% of the loan value. Shy (2002) develops a quick-and-easy
way of measuring costs of switching, and applies it to the Israeli cellular phone market and
Finnish current account market. He ﬁnds that switching costs can amount to as much as
11% of account balance for some banks. Ioannidou and Ongena (2007) ﬁnd that switching
borrowers receive a loan that is 80 base points lower than similar non-switching borrowers.
Many other papers have put forward methods for establishing the presence of switching
costs in an indirect way (see Degryse and Ongena (2007)).
6holder is required to notify all parties he or she transacts with (e.g. employer
or clients in the case of enterprises). Our study shows that the competitive
eﬀect of introducing number portability hinges on how exactly it modiﬁes
consumers’ switching costs.
Our paper builds on the existing literature on cost of switching. Start-
ing with seminal works by Von Weiszäcker (1984) and Klemperer (1987),
this literature mostly studied switching costs that are homogeneous for all
consumers (see Klemperer (1995) for an overview). In such settings, where
ﬁrms are able to price discriminate between loyal and switching customers,
typically no switching occurs, and all rents are competed away ex ante.
Recent work ﬁnds switching in the equilibrium when consumers exhibit suf-
ﬁcient heterogeneity in switching costs (as in e.g. Chen (1997)), and rents
not to be competed away (see e.g. Bouckaert and degryse (2004), who study
information-sharing decisions in credit markets). In a recent paper, Biglaiser
et al. (2007) look at entry when the switching costs of the incumbent’s con-
sumers increase. They show that the incumbent’s proﬁts can go down when
all consumers’ switching costs go up with a lump sum amount since entry
becomes more aggressive. We contribute to this literature by identifying
how an industry-wide modiﬁcation of switching costs aﬀects actual switch-
ing behavior and intertemporal competition. In particular, we show that
there are incentives for ﬁrms to apply methods whereby switching costs are
reduced by a lump sum, as this makes second-period poaching more prof-
itable. As a result, ﬁrms will compete for consumers less strongly during
the ﬁrst period. Hence, such a lump sum decrease will relax intertemporal
competition. In contrast, if a measure aﬀects switching costs proportion-
ally, then ﬁrms prefer not to implement it, as such action would increase
intertemporal competition.
7The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section,
we present the setup of the model. In section 3, we consider two choices that
reduce switching costs diﬀerently, i.e. proportionally in the one instance and
by a lump sum in the other. Section 4 consists in a welfare analysis. Section
5 discusses some extensions to the model and the robustness of our results.
The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 The model
In our model, two ﬁrms A and B must decide whether or not to take joint
action to reduce switching costs before competing in price over two periods.3
Once the initial decision on the implementation of the action has been taken,
our model closely follows Chen (1997). A unit mass of consumers wishes to
buy one unit of a good from ﬁrm A or B in each period considered. We
assume the reservation price to be suﬃciently high in order for the market
t ob ec o v e r e di nb o t hp e r i o d s .
If a consumer chooses to switch ﬁrms in period two (i.e. to buy the
product from a ﬁrm other than that from which he bought in period one),
he will incur a switching cost s,w i t hs uniformly distributed in the interval
[s,s]. To ensure that there is suﬃcient dispersion of the switching costs of
the consumers, we further assume 0 < 2s < s.4 Consumers are initially
unaware of the speciﬁc switching cost s that applies to them (they are,
however, aware of the distribution of s) ,a n do n l yd i s c o v e ri ta tt h ee n d
of period one. This is a natural assumption if the consumer needs to have
bought the product in order to ﬁnd out what cost is involved in switching
3Fershtman and Gandal (1994) call this semi-collusion.
4This condition ensures that there is always some switching in period two, when ﬁrms
can price discriminate between old and new customers. Our main insights would remain
qualitatively unaﬀected if this assumption were to be removed; see Section 5.
8away from it.5
Firms are able to price discriminate in period two between “old” cus-
tomers (i.e. customers who had already bought from that ﬁrm in period
one) and “new” customers (i.e. customers who bought from the rival ﬁrm in
period one). From the ﬁrms’ respective points of view, this pricing behavior
dissects the second-period market into a market for “loyal” customers, and
one for “switchers”. So the two ﬁrms simultaneously set prices p1
i (i = A, B)
in period one and prices pL
i and pS
i , for loyal and switching customers respec-
tively, in period two. We normalize marginal costs at zero for both ﬁrms.
Consumers and ﬁrms have a common discount factor 0 <δ<1 between
p e r i o d so n ea n dt w o .I np e r i o do n e ,c o n sumers will choose the product with
the lowest expected costs, rationally anticipating second-period behavior. If
consumers are indiﬀerent between the two ﬁrms, a proportion 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1
will choose ﬁrm A and the remainder will opt for ﬁrm B.
The timing of the model is as follows:
• period 0: ﬁrms A and B decide jointly whether or not to lower con-
sumers’ switching costs;
• period 1: the ﬁrms simultaneously set their period-one prices p1
i (i = A,
B); the consumers will opt for the lowest-priced ﬁrm, thereby taking
into account expected future prices (and expected costs of switching)
with a fraction σ going to A if they are indiﬀerent between the two;
consumers discover their speciﬁc switching cost s at the end of period
one;
• period 2: the ﬁrms simultaneously set period-two prices pL
i and pS
i ;
5For example, borrowers are generally unaware of the complexities awaiting them
should they decide to remortgage. Similarly, consumers may not know beforehand what
cost is involved in switching from one mobile phone service provider to another.
9consumers can now optimally choose whether or not to switch.
Next we provide further details on the two approaches to switching-cost
reduction we intend to study. The ﬁrst approach decreases switching costs
proportionally so that s 7→ αs,w i t h0 <α<1. In other words, the higher
the switching cost faced by the consumers, the more they stand to bene-
ﬁt. As in the example provided in the introduction, a jointly-introduced
and user-friendly guide on how to switch supplier will be most beneﬁcial
to consumers with high switching costs. It will, however, be only mar-
ginally beneﬁcial to consumers facing already very low switching costs. In
the second approach, switching costs are reduced by a lump-sum, so that
s 7→ s − γ,w i t h0 <γ<s . In other words, the decrease is independent of
the level of switching costs that the individual consumer faces. This applies,
for example, when the introduction of compatibility cuts a ﬁxed transaction
cost. While examples of both approaches are encountered in reality, our
main ﬁnding is that they create opposite incentives for ﬁrms to introduce
the measure in the ﬁrst place.
3A n a l y s i s
3.1 Second-period competition
Let us assume ﬁrm A has served a fraction k of the market in period 1, and
hence ﬁrm B has served the remaining 1 − k.6 We are then able to solve
the game by looking separately at the two market segments, i.e. that for
(potential) switchers and that for loyal customers, from the perspective of,
say, ﬁrm A. The fraction k is merely a scalar factor, and of no consequence
to the dynamics of the game. We therefore disregard it in the analysis, and
6In equilibrium we have that k =1 ,0, or σ.
10only at the end do we multiply the resulting proﬁts for ﬁrms A and B by
the proportions k and 1 − k respectively.
The ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts in either market segments, namely proﬁt
ΠS
i from switchers and proﬁt ΠL
i from the loyal consumers. Since the two
ﬁrms are able to discriminate between loyal customers and switchers, they




In what follows, we ﬁrst consider the case where no action is taken to
reduce switching costs. Subsequently, we solve the second period for the two
diﬀerent approaches to reducing switching costs.
3.1.1 No change in switching costs (base case)











i is the number of consumers from its ﬁrst-period market that ﬁrm i
retains in the second period. At the same time, ﬁrm i attracts qS
−i customers
from its competitor’s ﬁrst-period market. A consumer is indiﬀerent between
staying with ﬁrm i, or switching to its competitor −i if the switching cost




Consumers whose switching cost exceeds s∗ will remain loyal to their ﬁrst-
period choice. In contrast, consumers whose switching cost is lower than
s∗ will make the switch to the other supplier. Hence, ﬁrm i is able to
retain a fraction qL


































−i <s. In other words, excessive price diﬀerences will
result in the entire population switching to the ﬁrm oﬀering the lowest price.
Upon subsitution of qL
i and qS
−i, we obtain the ﬁrm’s best-response curves
to its competitor’s strategic variable in the market for i’s loyal customers
(pS
−i and pL





−i + s) if pS
−i 6 s − 2s
pS
−i + s if pS












i − s) if s 6 pL
i 6 2s − s
pL
i − s if pL
i > 2s − s.
Because of the assumption that s−2s > 0,w eﬁnd that the Nash equilibrium





























Note that our assumption of suﬃcient dispersion of switching costs, s−2s >
0, ensures that ﬁrm −i can still charge a positive price to switchers and thus
12earn a positive proﬁtf r o mt h e m . H o w e v e r ,ﬁrm i’s proﬁtf r o mi t sl o y a l
segment (abstracting from period-one market shares) always exceeds what
−i reaps from consumers who switch: ΠL
i > ΠS
−i. This is due to the lock-in
eﬀect, since consumers take s into account when making their purchasing
decision.
3.1.2 Switching-cost reduction method
We consider the case where two ﬁrms are jointly implementing a switching-
cost reduction. First, we describe an approach whereby the switching cost
is reduced proportionally. Subsequently, we turn our attention to an action
resulting in a lump-sum cut.
Proportional decrease in switching costs. The implementation of
such a technology or method would reduce a consumer’s switching cost s
to αs (with 0 <α<1). This proportional decrease retains the dispersion,











We observe that prices are proportional to α.C o n s e q u e n t l y , α lowers the
friction in the market and sharpens second-period competition. The change
does not however aﬀect the fraction of switchers as the indiﬀerent consumer






















Note that the possibility of achieving the equilibrium speciﬁed above is con-
ditional upon 0 <α (s − 2s), which is unaﬀected by α as 0 <α<1.
Lump-sum decrease in switching costs. Let us now consider the im-
pact on proﬁts of strategies whereby each consumer’s switching cost is low-
ered by a lump-sum γ (where 0 <γ<s ). Notice that such a lump-sum
decrease results in switching costs that are uniformly distributed over the
range [s − γ,s − γ]. In other words, the relative dispersion of the highest










(s − 2s + γ).
We observe that the incumbent’s price pL
i drops in γ, whereas the entrant’s
price pS
−i increases in γ. In other words, the higher relative dispersion re-
ﬂected in a higher γ makes it easier to attract switchers in a more proﬁtable
way. The proportions attracted are
qL
i =




s − 2s + γ
3(s − s)
,
where the number of switchers increases in γ. Since both prices and market













It should be noted, though, that proﬁtability of this segment can never
outgrow that of loyals, as it was assumed that no switcher can have a neg-
ative cost of switching (γ<s ).
143.2 First-period competition
We continue solving the model by including period one. Our analysis is
structured as follows. To begin with, we provide a general insight into the
likely ﬁrst-period and overall equilibrium. Subsequently, we translate this
equilibrium to the speciﬁcs of the base case, and each of the two approaches
to switching-cost reduction.
First we look at how consumers choose their ﬁrst-period ﬁrm. As we
assume consumers to be rational, they will be indiﬀerent between ﬁrms
A and B if the total expected discounted cost is equal for both. Note
that, at the beginning of period one, the speciﬁc value of a consumer’s s
is still unknown. Consumers will therefore consider the likelihood of them
switching in period two when calculating expected prices (and costs). This
likelihood of switching equals the likelihood of s being lower than the relevant
price diﬀerence. Since we consider a unit masso fc o n s u m e r s ,t h i sl i k e l i h o o d
equals precisely the fraction qS





























The ﬁrst term on either sides of the equation reﬂects the price to be paid
in period one. The second term on either side represent the discounted
expected cost in period two. It is made up of two components: the ﬁrst
corresponds with the expected second-period price to be paid if a consumer
remains loyal to his/her ﬁrst-period provider; the second represents the ex-
pected price and costs of switching from one supplier to another.
However, since second-period markets are separated, it follows that second-
period pricing is independent of period-one market shares. As a result, con-
15sumers’ expectations with regard to second-period prices and switching costs
are the same for both ﬁrms. This simpliﬁes the above expression to p1
A = p1
B
so that consumers will simply call on the cheapest-priced ﬁrm in period 1.
Total proﬁtf o rﬁrm i as a function of its own price p1
i and its competitor’s
price p1

























The ﬁr s tp a r to fE q .( 1 )o c c u r sw h e nﬁrm i announces a lower price than its
competitor. Consequently, it attracts all customers in period one, making a
proﬁto fp1
i, and it becomes the incumbent in period two, yielding δΠL
i .T h e
middle part occurs when both ﬁrms set equal prices. In this event, ﬁrm i has
a period-one market share of σi (equaling σ for ﬁrm A and 1−σ for B). This
makes ﬁrm i the incumbent for a fraction σi of the period-two market. The
remaining fraction 1−σi is the pool of potential switchers. In the ﬁnal part
of this proﬁt function, ﬁrm i charges the highest price and has no customers
in period one. Its period-two proﬁts arise only from switchers. The following
Proposition characterizes the period-one game and overall proﬁt.










Intuitively, we expect the lowest ﬁrst-period price that ﬁrm i would want
to charge to be −δ(ΠL
i − ΠS
i ). Put diﬀerently, below this price it is more
16attractive to have no period-one market share at all and to generate proﬁt
only from period-two switchers. This tells us that ﬁrms incur losses in
the ﬁrst period up to the discounted diﬀerence of whether or not one is
the only incumbent in period two. Indeed, recall that, in consequence of
al o c k - i ne ﬀect, the incumbency proﬁts are the highest, so that each ﬁrm
will be willing to sacriﬁce some of its period-one proﬁts with a view of
obtaining incumbency in period two. The proﬁtt h a taﬁrm can secure itself
is the discounted proﬁt δΠS
i , independent of market shares, since a higher
incumbency proﬁti np e r i o dt w oi se x a c t l yo ﬀset by the higher loss in period
one. The proof of this proposition is given in the Appendix.
Note that prices are negative here because marginal costs were assumed
to be zero; as long as marginal costs are suﬃciently high, this result does
not necessarily imply below-zero pricing. However, as observed in reality,
consumers can be lured during the ﬁrst period, not only with lower prices,
but also with non-monetary supplements (such as gifts, vouchers, free calls,
etc).
Let us now ﬁrst consider the equilibrium when ﬁrms implement a switching-
cost reduction method. In a next step, we compare the diﬀerent equilibria in
order to determine which will be preferred by ﬁrms. This will tell us whether
the adoption of a speciﬁc cost-reduction method will be implemented as an
endogenous choice.
3.2.1 Base case






17with total discounted proﬁts equal to δΠS







These proﬁts are identical to the second-period proﬁts for an entrant on the
entire market. Next, we consider how proﬁts change as the switching-cost
reduction strategy is implemented.
3.2.2 Switching-cost reduction strategy
Proportional decrease in switching costs. If switching costs are de-






where a lower factor α (and thus higher proportional decrease in s) reduces
the second-period proﬁtd i ﬀerence between incumbent and entrant. Hence,
it raises period-one prices compared to the base case.







representing a fraction α of proﬁts in the base case. Since α<1,p r o ﬁts drop
as the switching-cost reduction approach is implemented. The proﬁtt h a ta
ﬁrm is able to achieve declines in α,a sp r o ﬁtability on switchers decreases.
Firms will prefer not to implement measures that reduce switching costs
proportionally.
Lump sum decrease in switching cost. If switching costs are decreased





(s + s − 2γ).
18Again, a more substantial reduction in switching costs leads to a higher p1
i.








Clearly, proﬁts increase in γ. In other words, if switching costs are reduced
by a lump sum, total proﬁts increase. This result stems from a greater
relative dispersion of switching costs, so that serving switchers becomes
more proﬁtable. Firms ﬁnd it easier to enter one another’s markets in the
second period, which relaxes ﬁrst-period competition substantially. So the
introduction of the lump-sum reduction in switching costs increases proﬁts.
Consequently, ﬁrms will want to adopt such measures: this mode of lowering
switching costs is preferred to the base case, and will hence be endogenously
adopted if available.
3.3 Implementation of switching-cost-reduction strategies:
proportional versus lump-sum reductions
In this subsection, we focus on the semi-collusion stage, where ﬁrms decide
jointly on the adoption of a switching-cost reduction strategy, whereby they
must anticipate the eﬀe c to nc o m p e t i t i o ni nb o t hp e r i o d s . W eo b t a i no u r
results from comparing ﬁrms’ proﬁts in the base case with those achieved
should they jointly introduce the action to reduce switching costs. The latter
will only happen if both ﬁrms’ proﬁts are set to increase. Our results are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Firms tend to adopt approaches whereby consumers’ switch-
ing costs are reduced by a lump sum. In contrast, ﬁrms tend not to adopt
approaches whereby switching costs are reduced proportionally.
Proof: follows from section 3.2.2.
19So why do we obtain such diametrically opposed results in terms of ﬁrms’
willingness to adopt one or the other approach? The underlying reasoning is
that these diﬀerent actions aﬀect intertemporal price competition in oppo-
site ways. While a lump-sum switching-cost reduction creates more relative
dispersion of switching costs and makes second-period poaching more prof-
itable, this is not the case for a proportional decrease in switching cost.
A lump-sum decrease in consumers’ switching costs implies that ﬁrms are
able to secure more substantial overall proﬁts, as the gains to be achieved
through second-period poaching are greater. A proportional decrease, by
contrast, will result in smaller proﬁts and should therefore be rejected in
situations where ﬁrms can decide jointly on whether or not to implement it.
4 Welfare analysis
In this section, we consider whether the social planner will want ﬁrms to
adopt a switching-cost reduction strategy or not. We distinguish between
total welfare (i.e. consumer and producer surplus) on the one hand and
consumer welfare on the other. The ﬁrst-best world for total welfare is
one where no switching takes place. We measure welfare by considering
its inverse, i.e. welfare costs. Assuming that demand is inelastic and that
all production costs and switching-cost reduction approaches are zero, total
welfare consists only of the switching costs incurred by consumers who actu-
ally switch suppliers. We discount all welfare measures with δ as switching
takes place in the second period.
Let us ﬁrst discuss the base case, with given switching costs. Total







20with the ﬁrst term after the discount rate is the market share of switchers
and the second term is the average switching cost incurred by switchers,
E(s|s<p L
i −pS
−i). Consumer welfare cost CW represents the total amount
that is paid to ﬁrms and the discounted switching costs incurred (i.e. TW),
which yields























Next, we look at social welfare assuming that ﬁrms adopt the switching-
cost reduction measure. We ﬁrst consider the case where the cut in switching
costs is proportional. It is easy to see that, if switching costs decrease by a
proportion (1 − α), the base case welfare measures should be multiplied by α.
After all, the same fraction of consumers switches in equilibrium, and ﬁrms’
proﬁts are multiplied by α. Therefore, both total and consumer welfare will
increase with the introduction of a proportional switching-cost reduction
measure. So while ﬁrms will not be inclined to adopt such a strategy, the
social planner would certainly be in favor of it being introduced.
Now let us consider social welfare in the case where switching costs are
reduced by a lump-sum γ.D i ﬀerent forces now aﬀect social welfare in diﬀer-
ent ways. Consequently, the picture obtained if switching costs are reduced
by a ﬁxed amount are not unambiguous. Intuitively, while switching costs
decrease, the greater relative dispersion of switching costs entails that more
people will switch and incur this cost.
If switching costs are reduced by a lump sum, the total welfare cost TW0
becomes
TW0 = δ
s − 2s + γ
3(s − s)
s +4 s − 5γ
6
,
where the ﬁrst term is the market share of switchers and the second term






Therefore, the social planner will only prefer a lump-sum switching-cost
reduction if γ is not excessively small. Any approach that lowers switching
costs by too little will increase dramatically the market share of switchers,
outweighing the beneﬁcial eﬀect of the switching-cost reduction. However,
if initially s>7
2s,t h e na n yv a l u ef o rγ improves total welfare.
















Comparing again, we ﬁnd that
CW0 >C W
for all γ since γ<s . In other words, consumers ex ante prefer that the
lump-sum approach not to be adopted. So if total welfare is increased by this
lump-sum reduction, it stems from an increase in ﬁrm proﬁts, not consumer
welfare.
We summarize this analysis in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 A proportional switching-cost reduction increases both total
and consumer welfare. By contrast, a lump-sum reduction decreases con-
sumer welfare, and increases total welfare only if γ>(14s − 4s)/5.
Proof: contained in the discussion above.
225 Discussion
In this section, we check the robustness of our results by considering a num-
ber of extensions to the model. First, it is assumed in the main analysis
that the technology eﬀects neither the marginal costs of servicing switchers
nor ﬁxed costs. Serving switchers, however, may induce a more substantial
marginal cost. A bank, for example, may have to perform additional pa-
perwork in accommodating a checking-account switcher, as some transfers
may require closer inspection. Also, developing the new technology may en-
tail a ﬁxed cost. It is therefore not unthinkable that a measure that would
reduce switching costs proportionally may be rejected by ﬁrms because of
the additional cost associated with its introduction.7 In particular, a higher
marginal costs of accommodating switchers as well as an increased ﬁxed
cost in consequence of the measure being introduced may compromise prof-
itablility. If switching costs are cut by a lump sum, however, an increase
in marginal costs for switchers will counterbalance the beneﬁts of a positive
γ. Intuitively, we see that a higher marginal cost for serving switchers will
reduce the second-period proﬁts a ﬁrm can secure for itself. Therefore, a
lump-sum approach that at once implies a higher marginal cost should at
least result in an equally large lump-sum decrease in consumer switching
costs in order for the option to be endogenously approved.
Second, our model considered a switching-cost reduction that is either
lump sum or proportional. New approaches to switching-cost reduction may
however involve a lump-sum as well as a proportional component. Obviously,
the endogenous adoption of an approach that reduces switching costs both
proportionally and by a lump sum will depend on the size of the respec-
7The introduction of bank account number portability at the European level has been
questioned by many players in the industry of being too costly.
23tive eﬀects. In particular, modest proportional decreases combined with
considerable lump-sum decreases will be endogenously adopted.8
Third, our model starts from suﬃcient dispersion of switching costs, so
that some switching occurs in equilibrium. Now consider the case where
s<2s, so that initially it is not proﬁtable to attract switchers and perfect
competition ensues. It is clear that a proportional decrease in switching
costs will not modify the results, as it will not create suﬃcient dispersion.
However, a lump-sum decrease in switching cost might, so that it becomes
proﬁtable to ﬁrms to poach one another’s customers. Firms will then adopt
the lump-sum method as this action will relax competition. This is the case
if s + γ > 2s.
6 Conclusion
Firms often decide jointly when setting consumers’ switching costs. In vari-
ous industries, we observe that ﬁrms tend to avoid switching-cost reduction
strategies, whereas in others we see that enterprises do reduce switching
costs, including voluntarily, by adopting uniform standards or compatible
technologies. In this paper, we consider why and when ﬁrms may or may
not wish to voluntarily adopt actions whereby switching costs are reduced.
More speciﬁcally, we look at two approaches that reduce switching costs in
ad i ﬀerent manner.
In the ﬁrst approach, consumers’ switching costs are cut proportionally.
That is to say, consumers’ switching costs are reduced in such a way that,
in absolute terms, consumers with high switching costs stand to gain more
than those with low switching costs. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms will not voluntarily
8More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that, in the (α,γ)-plane, the border of the region where
ﬁrms adopt the approach is a quadratic function, the location of which also depends on
s −2s. All combinations with high α and γ are adopted, whereas those with small α and
γ cases are not voluntarily introduced.
24adopt approaches whereby switching costs are decreased proportionally. The
intuition for this result is that a proportional decrease in switching costs
increases intertemporal competition: ﬁrms can now secure less proﬁtb y
poaching switchers only in the second period. The social planner, on the
other hand, will have a preference for methods leading to a proportional
decrease in switching costs.
By contrast, the second approach, whereby switching costs for all con-
sumers are cut with a lump sum, will be voluntarily adopted by ﬁrms. The
lump-sum reduction makes poaching in the second period more attractive,
thereby reducing intertemporal competition. The social planner, on the
other hand, will not necessarily be in favor of such lump-sum reductions, as
there is a tradeoﬀ to be considered: lower switching costs increase welfare
of switchers, but more consumers make the switch.
We contribute to the switching-cost literature by identifying how changes
in ﬁrm proﬁts and welfare depend on how the distribution of switching costs
is modiﬁed, whereas previous research has focused mainly on the level of
switching costs. In addition, our model considers how changes in switching
costs aﬀect switching behavior and intertemporal competition.
Our analysis may be applied to many industries and settings, includ-
ing banks and telecom companies: they have been reluctant to introduce
number portability, arguing that costs outweigh potential beneﬁts. While
this may be true, an alternative interpretation that ties in equally well with
the observed outcome is that number portability implies a proportional de-
crease in switching costs. In other words, consumers with higher switching
costs will beneﬁt the most. Without number portability, consumers who
have more correspondents or who carry out more ﬁnancial transactions will,
after all, also need to inform more people that they have switched to a new
25bank account or phone number. Hence, they face a higher switching cost.
The introduction of number portability therefore entails a greater beneﬁt
for these consumers than for those initially facing lower switching costs.
Various regulatory initiatives, like the Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA)
in the European Union, have been taken to enhance retail banking market
integration and competition. To the extent that the costs of introducing
number portability are not excessive, our social welfare results suggest that
policymakers should indeed aim at making ﬁrms adopt strategies whereby
switching costs are reduced proportionally.
By contrast, other industries have seen the implementation of uniform
standards even though this decreases switching costs. Insofar as such stan-
dards cut switching costs uniformly across all consumers, our model would
suggest that this outcome will arise endogenously. Here, policymakers face
at r a d e o ﬀ, as a lump-sum reduction in switching costs increases producer
surplus, while decreasing consumer welfare in consequence of more switch-
ing and higher prices. Total welfare, however, may increase if the lump-sum
decrease in switching cost is not too small.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.



















for lower values, any advantages of incumbency (i.e. δ(ΠL
i − ΠS
i ))a r eo ﬀset
by the ﬁrst-period price being too low. If p1
i = −δ(ΠL
i −ΠS
i ) then Πi = δΠS
i
irrespective of p1
−i. Dropping below this value can never yield higher proﬁts
26than δΠS
i , and even holds the risk of undercutting one’s rival and ending up
with proﬁts that are lower than that.
There is a unique Nash equilibrium with p1
i = −δ(ΠL
i − ΠS
i ), leading to
ap r o ﬁto fΠi = δΠS
i . Deviating from this price is never proﬁtable: a higher
price leads to a market share of zero, with no change in proﬁts, and a lower
price yields lower proﬁts δΠL
i +p1
i <δ ΠS
i . Furthermore no other equilibrium
can exist: if both i are priced above their respective −δ(ΠL
i −ΠS
i ),b y(2) they
can both improve by lowering their price, and if the lowest-priced service
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